The importance of intuitionistic temporal logics in Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence has become increasingly clear in the last few years. From the proof-theory point of view, intuitionistic temporal logics have made it possible to extend functional languages with new features via type theory, while from its semantical perspective several logics for reasoning about dynamical systems and several semantics for logic programming have their roots in this framework. In this paper we consider several axiomatic systems for intuitionistic linear temporal logic and show that each of these systems is sound for a class of structures based either on Kripke frames or on dynamic topological systems. Our topological semantics features a new interpretation for the 'henceforth' modality that is a natural intuitionistic variant of the classical one. Using the soundness results, we show that the seven logics obtained from the axiomatic systems are distinct.
Introduction
Intuitionistic logic (IL) [29] enjoys a myriad of interpretations based on computation, information or topology, making it a natural framework to reason about dynamic processes in which these phenomena play a crucial role. Thus it should not be surprising that combinations of intuitionistic logic and linear temporal logic (LTL) [33] have been proposed for applications within several different contexts.
The first involves the Curry-Howard correspondence [21] , which identifies intuitionistic proofs with the λ-terms of functional programming. Several extensions of the λ-calculus with operators from LTL have been proposed in order to introduce new features to functional languages: [8, 9] has suggested adding a 'next' ( ) operator to IL in order to define the type system λ , which allows extending functional languages with staged computation 1 [15] . [10] proposed the functional language Mini-ML which is supported by intuitionistic S4 and allows capturing complex forms of staged computation as well as runtime code generation. [38] later extended λ to λ by incorporating the 'henceforth' operator ( ), useful for modelling persistent code that can be executed at any subsequent state.
Alternately, intuitionistic temporal logics have been proposed as a tool for modelling semantically-given processes. [28] observed that an intuitionistic temporal logic with 'henceforth' and 'eventually' ( ) could be used for reasoning about safety and liveness conditions in possibly-terminating reactive systems, and [17] has suggested that a logic with 'eventually' can be used to provide a decidable framework in which to reason about topological dynamics. In the areas of nonmonotonic reasoning, knowledge representation (KR), and artificial intelligence, intuitionistic and intermediate logics have played an important role within the successful answer set programming (ASP) [6] paradigm for practical KR, leading to several extensions of modal ASP [7] that are supported by intuitionistic-based modal logics like temporal here and there [3] .
Despite interest in the above applications, there is a large gap to be filled regarding our understanding of the computational behaviour of intuitionistic temporal logics. We have successfuly employed semantical methods to show the decidability of the logic ITL e defined by a natural class of Kripke frames [5] and shown that these semantics correspond to a natural calculus over the -free fragment [13] . However, as we will see, in the presence of , new validities arise which may be undesirable from the point of view of an extended Curry-Howard isomorphism. Thus our goal is to provide semantics for weaker axiomaticallydefined intuitionistic temporal logics in order to provide tools for understanding their computational behaviour. We demonstrate the power of our semantics by separating several natural axiomatically-given calculi, which in particular answers in the negative a conjecture of [38] that the Gentzen-style and the Hilbert-style calculi presented there prove the same set of formulas.
There have already been some notable efforts towards a semantical study of intuitionistic temporal logics. [23] endowed Davies's logic with Kripke semantics and provided a complete deductive system. Bounded-time versions of logics with henceforth were later studied by [22] . Both use semantics based on Simpson's bi-relational models for intuitionistic modal logic [35] . Since then, [3] have shown that temporal here-and-there is decidable and enjoys a natural axiomatization. Topological semantics for intuitionistic modal and tense logics have also been studied by [11, 12] , and [25] suggested a topologically-defined intuitionistic variant of LTL with and . We call them the weak semantics and study them in Section 5, below. The decidability of the logic of the weak semantics remains open, but [17] has shown that a similar logic with 'eventually' instead of is decidable.
In this paper we lay the groundwork for an axiomatic treatment of intuitionistic linear temporal logics. We will introduce a 'minimal' intuitionistic temporal logic, ITL 0 , defined by adding standard axioms of LTL to intuitionistic modal logic. We also consider additional Fischer Servi axioms, a 'constant domain' axiom (p ∨ q) → p ∨ q, and a 'conditional excluded middle' axiom (¬ p ∧ ¬¬p) → ( q ∨ ¬ q). Combining these, we obtain seven intuitionistic temporal logics, each of them sound for a class of structures. Logics with the constant domain axiom are sound for the class of dynamical systems based on a poset, also called expanding posets, and the Fischer Servi axioms correspond to backwards-confluence of the transition function.
The constant domain axiom is not derivable from the others, and to show this, we will consider topological semantics for intuitionistic temporal logic. As our axioms involve both and , we would like to be able to interpret both tenses. As we discuss in Section 5, the weak semantics for do not satisfy some key LTL validities, namely p → p, • p → p, and p → p. Consequently, ITL 0 is not sound for this interpretation. In order to obtain models of ITL 0 , we propose an alternative interpretation for . Our approach is natural from an algebraic perspective, as we define the interpretation of ϕ via a greatest fixed point in the Heyting algebra of open sets. We will show that dynamic topological systems provide semantics for the logics without the constant domain axiom, from which we conclude the independence of the latter. Moreover, we show that the Fischer Servi axioms are valid for the class of open dynamical topological systems. The constant domain axiom shows that the { , }-logic of expanding posets is different from that of dynamic topological systems. We show via an alternative axiom that the { , }-logics are also different. Finally, we consider the special case where topological semantics are based on Euclidean spaces. We show that this leads to logics strictly between that of all spaces and that of expanding posets. In the special case of the real line, we exhibit an additional principle which is not valid on R n with n ≥ 2.
Layout. Section 2 introduces the syntax and the seven axiomatic systems we propose for intuitionistic temporal logic. Section 3 reviews dynamic topological systems, which are used in Section 4 to provide semantics for our formal language. Section 5 provides a weak semantics for the language. Section 6 shows that four of our logics are each sound for a class of dynamical systems, and Section 7 shows that the remaining logics are sound for Euclidean spaces. These soundness results are used in Section 8 to show that the seven logics considered are pairwise distinct. Finally, Section 9 lists some open questions.
Syntax and axiomatics
In this section we will introduce seven natural intuitionistic temporal logics. All of the axioms have appeared either in the intuitionistic logic, the temporal logic, or the intuitionistic modal logic literature. They will be based on the language of linear temporal logic, as defined next.
Fix a countably infinite set P of propositional variables. The language L of intuitionistic (linear) temporal logic ITL is given by the grammar
where p ∈ P. As usual, we use ¬ϕ as a shorthand for ϕ → ⊥ and ϕ ↔ ψ as a shorthand for (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ). We read as 'next', as 'eventually', and as 'henceforth'. Given any formula ϕ, we denote the set of subformulas of ϕ by sub(ϕ).The language L is defined as the sublanguage of L without the modality . Similarly, L is the language without . The language whose only tense is is denoted L .
We begin by establishing our basic axiomatization. It is obtained by adapting the standard axioms and inference rules of LTL [27] , as well as their dual versions. To be precise, the logic ITL 0 is the least set of L-formulas closed under the following rules and axioms. i) All intuitionistic tautologies.
Each axiom is either included in the axiomatization of Goldblatt [20, page 87] or is a mild variant of one of them (e.g., a contrapositive); this is standard in intuitionistic modal logic, as such variants are needed to account for the independence of the basic connectives. We do not consider 'until' in this paper, but have previously studied its intuitionistic semantics [2] . Modal intuitionistic logics often involve additional axioms, and in particular Fischer Servi [18] includes the schema
We also define
This notation is justified in view of the fact that is self-dual, along with the following.
Proof. We reason within ITL 0 . Assume 1) FS • ( p, q) and 2) ( p → q). Notice that p → p and p → p are derivable from axioms viii) and ix). Therefore, from this and assumption 2) we conclude p → p. Thanks to assumption 1) and Modus Ponens we conclude ( p → q). Therefore, ( p → p) → ( p → q). By Rule xiii), we obtain (( p → p) → ( p → q)). By the induction axiom x) we derive ( p → p) → ( p → q). From the assumption 2) and Modus Ponens it follows ( p → q). Note that ( p → q) → (p → q) is derivable in ITL 0 . From Rule xiii) and Axiom vi) we obtain ( p → q) → (p → q). From this and ( p → q) it follows (p → q) as required.
Later we will show that these schemas lead to logics strictly stronger than ITL 0 . Next we consider additional axioms reminiscent of constant domain axioms in first-order intuitionistic logic. As we will see, in the context of intuitionistic temporal logics, these axioms separate Kripke semantics from the more general topological semantics.
Here, CD stands for 'constant domain' and BI for 'backward induction'. We also define as special cases CD − (ϕ) = CD(¬ϕ, ϕ) and BI − (ϕ) = BI(¬ϕ, ϕ).
The axiom CD might not be desirable from a constructive perspective, as from (ϕ ∨ ψ) one cannot in general extract an upper bound for a witness for ψ. 2 The axiom BI is a -free version of CD, as witnessed by the following.
Proposition 2.
1. ITL 0 ⊢ CD(p, q) → BI(p, q).
2. ITL 0 ⊢ BI(p, q) → CD(p, q).
Proof. We reason within ITL 0 . For the first claim, assume that 1) CD(p, q), 2) ( q → q), and 3) (p ∨ q). From 1) and 3) we obtain p ∨ q, which together with 2) and axiom xi) gives us p ∨ q, as needed. For the second, assume 1) BI(p, q) and 2) (p ∨ q). From (p ∨ q), axiom ix) and some modal reasoning, (p ∨ q). Also from axiom ix) and rule xiii), ( q → q). From BI(p, q) we obtain p ∨ q, as needed.
Finally, we introduce the conditional excluded middle axiom
This axiom states that a certain instance of excluded middle holds, provided some assumptions are satisfied. It is less familiar than others we have considered, but its role will become clear when we consider semantics based on the real line. With this, we define the following logics:
Here, RTL stands for 'real temporal logic', ETL for 'Euclidean temporal logic' and CDTL for 'constant domain temporal logic'. CDTL + was also denoted ITL 1 in [4] . Note that our list is not meant to exhaust all combinations of axioms; rather, we only consider logics that arise from natural classes of models. We may establish inclusions between these logics using purely syntactical means.
This immediately yields the following inclusions. Proposition 3. RTL ⊆ ETL + ⊆ CDTL + As we will see throughout the paper, these are the only non-trivial inclusion between these logics.
We are also interested in logics over sublanguages of L. For any logic Λ defined above, let Λ be defined by restricting similarly all rules and axioms to L , except that when CD is an axiom of Λ, we add the axiom BI to Λ . The logic ITL 0 is similar to a Hilbert calculus for the ∧, ∨-free fragment considered by Yuse and Igarashi [38] , although they do not include induction but include the axioms ϕ → ϕ and ϕ ↔ ϕ. It is not difficult to check that the latter are derivable from our basic axioms, and hence their logic is contained in ITL 0 .
We also define Λ be the logic obtained by restricting all rules and axioms to L , and adding the rules ϕ→ψ ϕ→ ψ and ϕ→ϕ ϕ→ϕ . Note that these rules correspond to axioms vii), xi), respectively, but do not involve . In this paper we are mostly concerned with logics including 'henceforth', but -free logics are studied in detail by [13] .
Dynamic topological systems
The seven logics over L defined above are pairwise distinct. We will show this by introducing semantics for each of them. They will be based on dynamic topological systems (or dynamical systems for short), which, as was observed in [17] , generalize their Kripke semantics [5] . Let us first recall the definition of a topological space [14] :
Dually, we define the closure A as X \ (X \ A) • ; this is the smallest closed set containing A.
. An open, continuous function is an interior map, and a bijective interior map is a homeomorphism.
A dynamical system is then a topological space equipped with a continuous function:
A dynamical (topological) system is a triple X = (X, T , S) such that (X, T ) is a topological space and S : X → X is continuous. We say that X is invertible if S is a homeomorphism, i.e., S is bijective and S −1 is also a continuous function, and open if S is an interior map.
Topological spaces generalize posets in the following way. Let F = (W, ) be a poset; that is, W is any set and is a transitive, reflexive, antisymmetric relation on W . To see F as a topological space, define ↑w = {v : w v} . Then consider the topology T on W given by setting U ⊆ W to be open if and only if, whenever w ∈ U , we have ↑w ⊆ U . A topology of this form is a up-set topology [1] . The interior operator on such a topological space can be computed by
i.e., w lies on the interior of A if whenever v w, it follows that v ∈ A. Throughout this text we will often identify partial orders with their corresponding topologies, and many times do so tacitly. In particular, a dynamical system generated by a poset is called a dynamical or expanding poset, due to its relation to expanding products of modal logics [19] . It will be useful to characterize the continuous and open functions on posets: 
These are confluence properties common in multi-modal logics; open, continuous maps on a poset are called persistent. 
Semantics
In this section we will see how dynamical systems can be used to provide a natural intuitionistic semantics for the language of linear temporal logic.
Formulas are interpreted as open subspaces of a dynamical system. Each propositional variable p is assigned an open set p , and then · is defined recursively for more complex formulas according to the following: Definition 3. Given a dynamical system X = (X, T , S), a valuation on X is a function · : L → T such that:
consisting of a dynamical system with a valuation is a dynamic topological model, and if T is generated by a partial order, we will say that M is a dynamic poset model.
All of the semantic clauses are standard from either intuitionistic or temporal logic, with the exception of that for ϕ, which we discuss in greater detail below. It is not hard to check by structural induction on ϕ that ϕ is uniquely defined given any assignment of the propositional variables to open sets, and that ϕ is always open. We define validity in the standard way, and with this introduce seven additional semantically-defined logics, two of which were already studied in [5] .
is any dynamic topological model and ϕ ∈ L is any formula, we write M |= ϕ if ϕ = X. Similarly, if X = (X, T , S) is a dynamical system, we write X |= ϕ if for any valuation · on X , we have that (X , · ) |= ϕ. Finally, if Ω is a class of structures, we write Ω |= ϕ if for every A ∈ Ω, A |= ϕ, in which case we say that ϕ is valid on Ω.
We write ITL Ω , for the set of L formulas valid on Ω, and for ♣ ∈ { , , }, we set ITL Ω ♣ = ITL Ω ∩ L ♣ . We denote the set of all dynamical systems with a continuous function by c, the class of all expanding posets by e, the class of all persistent posets by p, and the class of all open dynamical systems by o. Thus, for example, ITL c denotes the set of formulas valid over the class of dynamical systems. When Ω = {A} we omit brackets and write e.g. ITL A .
In practice, it is convenient to have a 'pointwise' characterization of the semantic clauses of Definition 3. For a model M = (X, T , S, · ), x ∈ X and ϕ ∈ L, we write M, x |= ϕ if x ∈ ϕ , and M |= ϕ if ϕ = X. Then, in view of (1), given formulas ϕ and ψ, M, x |= ϕ → ψ if and only if there is a neighbourhood U of x such that for all y ∈ U , if M, y |= ϕ then M, y |= ψ; note that this is a special case of neighbourhood semantics [32] .
Using (2) , this can be simplified somewhat in the case that T is generated by a partial order : Remark 1. This is not the only natural interpretation for : in Section 5, we discuss what we will call the weak interpretation of , first proposed in [25] . This interpretation is analogous to the topological interpretation of ∀x in quantified intuitionistic logic. When comparing the two, we may refer to the semantics of Definition 3 as the strong interpretation. To see this, note that one implication is obvious since R is open and Sinvariant, so if ϕ = R it follows that M, 0 |= ϕ. For the other implication, assume that M, 0 |= ϕ, so that there is an S-invariant, open U ⊆ ϕ with 0 ∈ U . It follows from U being open that for some ε > 0, (−ε, ε) ⊆ U . Now, let x ∈ R, and let n be large enough so that |2 −n x| < ε. Then, 2 −n x ∈ U , and since U is S-invariant, x = S n (2 −n x) ∈ U . Since x was arbitrary, U = R, and it follows that M |= ϕ.
On the other hand, suppose that 0 < a < x and (a, ∞) ⊆ ϕ . Then, (a, ∞) is open and S-invariant, so it follows that x ∈ ϕ . Hence in this case we do not require that ϕ = R. Similarly, if x < a < 0 and (−∞, a) ⊆ ϕ , we readily obtain x ∈ ϕ .
As was the case for implication, our interpretation for becomes familiar when restricted to Kripke semantics. Proposition 6. Let M = (W, , S, · ) be any dynamic poset model, w ∈ W and ϕ ∈ L. Then, the following are equivalent:
c) for all n < ω, M, S n (w) |= ϕ.
Proof. First we prove that a) implies b). Assume that M, w |= ϕ, so that there is an If v ∈ U , then v S n (w) for some n < ω and hence by upwards persistence, from M, S n (w) |= ϕ we obtain M, v |= ϕ; moreover, S(v) S n+1 (w) so S(v) ∈ U . Since v ∈ U was arbitrary, we conclude that U is S-invariant and U ⊆ ϕ . Thus U witnesses that M, w |= ϕ.
As we will see in Section 5, Proposition 6 fails over the class of dynamical systems. However, over the class of open dynamical systems, we may simplify our definition of 'henceforth' a bit. 
Proof. First assume that a) holds, and let U be an S-invariant neighbourhood of x such that U ⊆ ϕ . Then, using the S-invariance of U we see by a routine induction on n that U ⊆ S −n ϕ , hence U ⊆ n<ω S −n ϕ . As U is open, U ⊆ n<ω S −n ϕ • , and hence b) holds.
For the other direction, assume that b) holds, and let U = n<ω S −n ϕ • .
Clearly U is open; we claim that it is S-invariant. We have that
where the latter inclusion is obtained by distributing S over the intersection. Moreover, S[U ] is open, since S is assumed to be an open function. Thus
witnessing that a) holds.
Weak semantics for 'henceforth'
[25] proposed an interpretation of distinct from the interpretation given in Definition 3. By analogy with , one might try to interpret ϕ as n≥0 S −n ϕ . But this does not quite work since, on this interpretation, there is no guarantee that ϕ is open. Instead, we consider interpreting ϕ as the interior of n≥0 S −n ϕ . That is, we consider replacing the clause for , in Definition 3, with the following clause:
This condition is weaker than the existence of an S-invariant neighbourhood, so we call this the weak interpretation of and write |= w for validity in the weak semantics. We may also refer to the semantics of Definition 3 as the strong semantics.
This interpretation of is analogous to the interpretation, in [34] and going back to [30] , of ∀x in the topological semantics for quantified intuitionistic logic. In particular, if we interpret variables as ranging over some non-empty domain D, the semantic clauses for ∃x and ∀x are, essentially, the following:
One reason for preferring the semantics of Section 4 is that certain key LTL principles are not valid in the weak semantics. It is easy to define a model M so that,
In particular, let M = (X, T , S, · ), where X is the real line with the standard topology; S is defined as follows,
and p = (−∞, 1). Note that S −n ( p ) = (−∞, 1/2 n ), for n ≥ 0. Thus, n≥0 S −n p = n≥1 S −n p = (−∞, 0]. So, p = p = (−∞, 0). So, p = p = ∅. So, p → p = p → p = p → p = (0, ∞) = X.
The only axiom scheme for ITL 0 that is not valid in the weak semantics is axiom viii), ϕ → ϕ ∧ ϕ (see Sections 2, above). In particular, for example, the induction axioms,
are valid in the weak semantics. This suggests that the set of weak validities can be axiomatized with all of the ITL 0 axiom schemes except axiom scheme viii), plus some weak variant of axiom scheme viii). We leave the question of finding a suitable axiom system open, and put the weak semantics aside until the end of the paper.
Soundness
Let us return our attention to the strong semantics of Definition 3. We will show that some of the logics we have considered are sound for semantics based on different classes of dynamic topological systems. First we show that our minimal logic is sound for the class of all dynamical systems. The following simple observation will be useful. 
Theorem 1. ITL 0 is sound for the class of dynamical systems; that is, ITL 0 ⊆ ITL c .
Proof. Let M = (X, T , S, · ) be any dynamical topological model; we must check that all the axioms i)-xi) are valid on M and the rules xii), xiii) preserve validity. Note that all intuitionistic tautologies are valid due to the soundness for topological semantics [29] . Many of the other axioms can be checked routinely, so we focus only on those axioms involving the continuity of S or the semantics for .
v) Suppose that x ∈ (ϕ → ψ) . Then, S(x) ∈ ϕ → ψ . Since S is continuous and ϕ → ψ is open, U = S −1 ϕ → ψ is a neighbourhood of x. Then, for y ∈ U , if y ∈ ϕ , it follows that S(y) ∈ ϕ ∩ ϕ → ψ , so that S(y) ∈ ψ and y ∈ ψ . Since y ∈ U was arbitrary, x ∈ ϕ → ψ , thus (ϕ → ψ) ⊆ ϕ → ψ , and by Lemma 3 (which we will henceforth use without mention), v) is valid on M.
vi) Suppose that x ∈ (ϕ → ψ) . Then, there is an S-invariant neighbourhood U of x such that U ⊆ ϕ → ψ . We claim that if y ∈ U ∩ ϕ it follows that y ∈ ψ , from which we obtain x ∈ ϕ → ψ , as needed. If y ∈ U ∩ ϕ , let U ′ be an S-invariant neighbourhood of y such that U ′ ⊆ ϕ , and define
Since U is open, it suffices to prove that U ⊆ ψ . Moreover, U is Sinvariant, therefore it suffices to prove that U ⊆ ψ , which is direct because
vii) As before, suppose that x ∈ (ϕ → ψ) , and let U be an S-invariant neighbourhood of x such that U ⊆ ϕ → ψ . If y ∈ U ∩ ϕ , then S n (y) ∈ ϕ for some n; since U is S-invariant, S n (y) ∈ U , hence S n (y) ∈ ψ and y ∈ ψ . We conclude that x ∈ ϕ → ψ . viii) Suppose that x ∈ ϕ , and let U ⊆ ϕ be an S-invariant neighbourhood of x. Then, x ∈ U , so x ∈ ϕ . Moreover, U is also an S-invariant neighbourhood of S(x), so S(x) ∈ ϕ and thus x ∈ ϕ . We conclude that x ∈ ϕ ∧ ϕ .
is open (by the intuitionistic semantics) and S-invariant, since if y ∈ U , from Proof. Let M = (X, , S, · ) be a dynamic poset model; in view of Theorem 1, it only remains to check that CD and BI are valid on M. However, by Proposition 2, BI is a consequence of CD, so we only check the latter. Suppose that x ∈ (ϕ ∨ ψ) , but x ∈ ϕ . Then, in view of Proposition 6, for some n ≥ 0, S n (x) ∈ ϕ . It follows that S n (x) ∈ ψ , so that x ∈ ψ .
Note that the relational semantics are used in an essential way, since Proposition 6 is not available in the topological setting, and indeed we will show in Proposition 8 that these axioms are not topologically valid. But before that, let's turn our attention to the Fischer Servi axioms. Proof. Let M = (X, T , S, · ) be a dynamical topological model where S is an interior map. We check that axiom FS • is valid on M.
Suppose that x ∈ ϕ → ψ , and let U ⊆ ϕ → ψ be a neighbourhood of x. Since S is open, V = S[U ] is a neighbourhood of S(x). Let y ∈ V ∩ ϕ , and choose z ∈ U so that y = S(z). Then, z ∈ U ∩ ϕ , so that z ∈ ψ , i.e. y ∈ ψ . Since y ∈ V was arbitrary, S(x) ∈ ϕ → ψ , and x ∈ (ϕ → ψ) .
As an easy consequence, we mention the following combination of Theorems 2 and 3. Recall that dynamic posets with an interior map are also called persistent.
Corollary 1. CDTL + and CDTL + are sound for the class of persistent posets, that is, CDTL + ⊆ ITL p and CDTL + ⊆ ITL p .
Euclidean spaces
The celebrated McKinsey-Tarski theorem states that intuitionistic propositional logic is complete for the real line, and more generally for a wide class of metric spaces which includes each Eucildean space R n [37] . Thus it is natural to ask if a similar result holds for intuitionistic temporal logics, which could lead to applications in spatio-temporal reasoning. As we will see in this section, the answer to this question is negative; however, we identify some principles which could lead to an axiomatization for these spaces.
Let us consider the real line.
is valid on R.
Proof. Suppose that (R, S, · ) is a model based on R and that x ∈ ¬ p ∧ ¬¬p . From x ∈ ¬¬p and the semantics of double negation (discussed in [17] ) we see that there is a neighbourhood V of S(x) such that V ⊆ p . It follows from the intermediate value theorem that if U is a neighbourhood of x and S[U ] is not a singleton, S[U ] ∩ V contains an open set and hence S[U ] ∩ p = ∅. Meanwhile, from x ∈ ¬ p we see that x has a neighbourhood U * such that S[U * ] ∩ p = ∅, hence for such a U * we must have that S[U * ] is the singleton {S(x)}. But then either S(x) ∈ q and x ∈ q , or else S(x) ∈ q , which means that U * ∩ q = ∅ and thus U * witnesses that x ∈ ¬ q . In either case, x ∈ q ∨ ¬ q , as required.
Remark 2. It is tempting to conjecture that CEM axiomatizes the L -logic of the real line, but there is a possibility that additional axioms are required. CEM is an intuitionistic variant of similar formulas in [26, 36] showing that the dynamic topological logic (DTL) of the real line is different from the dynamic topological logic of arbitrary spaces. We will not review DTL here, but it is a classical cousin of intuitionistic temporal logic [17, 13] . The problem of axiomatizing DTL over the real line has long remained open, and [31] give further examples of valid formulas not derivable from the classical analogue of CEM. We do not know if these formulas also have intuitionistic counterparts. However, there is some possibility that the problem of axiomatizing ITL R will prove to be more tractable than that of axiomatizing DTL R .
Since CEM is not valid for R n in general, it does not establish whether intuitionistic temporal logics are incomplete for Euclidean spaces. However, this can be shown using CD − , which is valid on any locally connected space. Recall that a subset C of a topological space X is connected if whenever A, B are disjoint open sets such that C ⊆ A ∪ B, it follows that C ⊆ A or C ⊆ B. The space X is locally connected if whenever U is open and x ∈ U , there is a connected neighbourhood V ⊆ U of x. It is well-known that R n is locally connected for all n.
The following properties regarding connectedness will be useful below. Suppose that X is a topological space and S : X → X is continuous. Then, for every C ⊆ X, we have that if C is connected, then so is S[C]. Moreover, if A ⊆ X, A can be partitioned into a family of maximal connected sets called the connected components of A. If X is locally connected and A is open, then the connected components of A are also open [14] .
Lemma 5. The formula CD − (p) is valid on the class of locally connected spaces.
Proof. Let (X, T , S, · ) be a model based on a locally connected space, and suppose that x ∈ (p ∨ ¬p) ; we must show that x ∈ ¬p ∨ p . Let U ⊆ p ∨ ¬p be an S-invariant neighbourhood of x. For n < ω, let V n be the connected component of U containing S n (x), and set V = n<ω V n . Since each V n ⊆ U ⊆ p ∪ ¬p and the latter are disjoint and open, it follows that either V n ⊆ p or V n ⊆ ¬p . If V n ⊆ p for some n, it immediately follows that x ∈ p , and we are done. Otherwise, V n ⊆ ¬p for all n. Clearly V is open; we claim that it is also S-invariant. To see this, note that S[V n ] ⊆ U . Note that U can be written as the disjoint union of two open sets as
However, S[V n ] ∩ V n+1 is non-empty, so we must have S[V n ] ⊆ V n+1 , and since n was arbitrary, S[V ] ⊆ V , as claimed. Hence V witnesses that x ∈ ¬p , as needed.
In conclusion, we obtain the following. 1. RTL is sound for R.
2.
ETL is sound for {R n : n ≥ 0}.
3. ETL + is sound for the class of invertible systems based on {R n : n ≥ 0}.
Independence
In this section we will use our soundness results to show that the seven logics we have considered are pairwise distinct. First we note that the formulas CD and BI separate Kripke semantics from the general topological semantics. Proof. Define a model M on R, with S(x) = 2x, p = (−∞, 1) and q = (0, ∞). Clearly p ∨ q = R, so that (p ∨ q) = R as well.
Let us see that M, 0 |= CD(p, q). Since M, 0 |= (p ∨ q), it suffices to show that M, 0 |= p ∨ q. It is clear that M, 0 |= q simply because S n (0) = 0 ∈ q for all n. Meanwhile, by Example 1, M, 0 |= p if and only if p = R, which is not the case. We conclude that M, 0 |= CD(p, q).
To see that M, 0 |= BI(p, q) we proceed similarly, where the only new ingredient is the observation that M, 0 |= ( q → q). But this follows easily from the fact that if M, x |= q, then x > 0 so that M, x |= q, hence q → q = R.
The Fischer Servi axioms are also not valid in general, as already shown in [2] . From this and the soundness of ITL + (Theorem 3), we immediately obtain that they are not derivable in ITL 0 . For the second we let N be a model based on R with S : R → R given by S(x) = 0 for all x, p = (0, ∞), and q = ∅. Then we have that p = (0, ∞), so that −1 ∈ ¬ p and hence −1 ∈ p → q . However, if U is an S-invariant neighbourhood of −1 then 0 = S(−1) ∈ U , but 0 ∈ p → q = (−∞, 0), hence −1 ∈ (p → q) . It follows that −1 ∈ FS (p, q) . Remark 3. As mentioned previously, [38] present a Hilbert-calculus which yields a sub-logic of ITL 0 . They also present a Gentzen-style calculus and conjecture that their two calculi prove the same set of formulas. However, [23] show that the formula FS • (p, q) is derivable in this Gentzen calculus. Thus Proposition 9 shows that the two calculi are not equivalent. Now we show that our axioms for Euclidean spaces are not valid in general. In particular, CEM is valid for R, but it is not valid for higher-dimensional spaces. Lemma 6. The formula CEM is not valid on the class of expanding posets, hence CDTL ⊢ CEM.
Proof. Consider the model M = (W, , S, · ), where W = {w 0 , w 1 , v 0 , v 1 , v 2 }, x i y j if and only if x = y and i ≤ j, S(x i ) = v i , p = {v 2 } and q = {v 1 , v 2 } (see Figure 3 ). Then, it is not hard to check that CEM(p, q) = (¬ p∧ ¬¬p) → ( q ∨ ¬ q) fails at w 0 . and let p = Q \ D. It is readily verified that 1 n+π ∈ Q for any n ∈ N, and hence Q ∩ n − 1 n+π , n + 1 n+π = Q ∩ n − 1 n+π , n + 1 n+π , so that D is both closed and open. It follows from this that ¬p = D, and hence p ∨ ¬p = Q; but Q is open and S-invariant, so (p ∨ ¬p) = Q as well. In particular, 0 ∈ (p ∨ ¬p) .
Moreover, one can check that (a) 0 ∈ p , but (b) if x ∈ (0, 1 /2) and n > 1 /x, then S n (x) ∈ p .
If U is an S-closed neighbourhood of 0, U contains some x ∈ (0, 1 /2). From (b) it follows that S n (x) ∈ ¬p , hence U ⊆ ¬p ; since U was arbitrary, 0 ∈ ¬ϕ .
The above independence results are sufficient to see that the only non-trivial inclusions between our axiomatic systems are given by Proposition 3.
Theorem 5. The logics ITL 0 , ITL + , CDTL, RTL, ETL, ETL + , and CDTL + are pairwise distinct. All subset relations between them are indicated in Figure 4 .
Similarly, ITL 0 , ITL + , CDTL , RTL , ETL , ETL + , and CDTL + are pairwise distinct. Figure 4 remains accurate for these logics if we replace Λ by Λ and CD by BI throughout.
Proof. Each arrow from Λ 1 to Λ 2 is labelled by a formula which we have previously shown to belong to Λ 2 \ Λ 1 , thus establishing the theorem.
Concluding Remarks
We have proposed a natural 'minimalist' intuitionistic temporal logic, ITL 0 , along with possible extensions including Fischer Servi or constant domain axioms. We have seen that relational semantics validate the constant domain axiom, leading us to consider a wider class of models based on topological spaces, with a novel interpretation for 'henceforth' based on invariant neighbourhoods. With this, we have shown that the logics ITL 0 , CDTL, ITL + and CDTL + are sound for the class of all dynamical systems, of all dynamical posets, of all open dynamical systems, and of all persistent dynamical posets, respectively, which we have used in order to prove that the logics are pairwise distinct. We have also shown that the logics RTL, ETL, and ETL + , based on Euclidean spaces, are distinct from any of the above-mentioned logics. Of course this immediately raises the question of completeness, which we have not addressed. Specifically, the following are left open. Question 1. Are the logics:
• ITL 0 and ITL 0 complete for the class of dynamical systems?
• CDTL and CDTL complete for the class of expanding posets?
• ITL + , ITL + and ITL + complete for the class of open dynamical systems?
• RTL, ETL complete for the class of systems based on R or Euclidean spaces, respectively?
• ETL + complete for the class of systems based on Euclidean spaces with a homeomorphism? Figure 4 : Graph displaying the dependences among the different logics studied in this paper. Nodes corresponds to different logic while edges mean two different kinds of relation. Edges of the form Λ 1 -ϕ → Λ 2 mean that Λ 1 ⊆ Λ 2 and, moreover, ϕ ∈ Λ 2 \ Λ 1 . Edges of the form Λ 1 --ϕ Λ 2 mean that Λ 2 ⊆ Λ 1 and ϕ ∈ Λ 2 \ Λ 1 .
• CDTL + , CDTL + and CDTL + complete for the class of persistent posets?
We already know that ITL 0 is sound and complete for the class of expanding posets and for Euclidean spaces [13] . However, the completeness of ITL + and CDTL + is likely to be a more difficult problem than that of ITL 0 , as in these cases it is not even known if the set of valid formulas is computably enumerable, let alone decidable. In any of these a negative answer is possible, since that is the case for their classical counterparts [24] and these logics do not have the finite model property [5] . Nevertheless, the proofs of non-axiomatizability in the classical case do not carry over to the intuitionistic setting in an obvious way, and these remain challenging open problems.
Assuming a negative answer to Question 1, our methods do not settle whether all inclusions of Figure 4 would hold after replacing each axiomatic system by its corresponding semantically-defined logic (e.g. ITL c instead of ITL 0 , ITL e instead of CDTL, etc.). For example, we have that ETL ⊂ CDTL, but it is unclear whether ITL {R n :n<ω} ⊂ ITL e . Question 3. Would Figure 4 remain accurate for the respective semanticallydefined logics?
In fact, we conjecture that ITL R 2 ⊂ ITL e , which should be provable by adapting techniques from [16] . Finally, we leave open a thorough analysis of the weak semantics of Section 5. While they do not validate ITL 0 , it is possible that they do correspond to natural axiomatic systems. Note that by Propositions 6 and 7, the weak logics coincide with their strong counterparts whenever either the space is a poset or the transition function is open, and hence the weak logics do not have to be considered separately in these cases. However, we can pose similar questions for the weak logic over Euclidean spaces.
Question 5. Are the weak logics of all dynamical systems and of all Euclidean systems distinct?
